We consider three new axioms for surplus sharing problems. The first is strong monotonicity which says that workers should be rewarded for increases in productivity and the second says that productive workers should receive some compensation. The third requires that the surplus sharing rule should be well defined (and continuous on) the set of threshold functions. We show that none of the standard "equitable" mechanisms satisfy either of these axioms and then present a constructive characterization of mechanisms which do. Using this we construct several new mechanisms. These are the Almost Flat mechanism, the Spread Aumann-Shapley mechanism, and the Spread Serial mechanism, which have many desirable properties.
Introduction
The sharing of joint costs or surplus arise in a large number of situations. Surplus sharing problems often arise from the sharing of profits in joint ventures [14, 18, 25, 26] . Formally equivalent are cost sharing problems in which the cost of serving agents' demands must be divided. These problems range from allocating telephone costs in a university [4] to sharing the costs for public goods [17, 7] , such as electricity [16] , to allocating cost [12, 13] or congestion on the Internet [8, 28, 29] , to sharing the cost for research consortia [1] .
Throughout this paper we will stick to the surplus sharing interpretation as our axioms are somewhat more compelling in that context, although our results are applicable in the cost sharing setting.
In this paper we consider several new axioms in the study of surplus sharing mechanisms.
These axioms are: strong monotonicity, converse dummy, and continuous extendibility to the threshold functions. We show that many of the important surplus sharing mechanisms do not satisfy these axioms and then construct several new mechanism which do, based on a constructive characterization of these axioms.
We now give the motivation behind these axioms, which are most easily described in the cooperative production context. Consider a cooperative enterprise in which there are N participants, and each participant determines the amount of "effort" which they put into the enterprise. The total profit is a (nondecreasing) function of this vector of efforts.
1 A surplus sharing mechanism is a rule for dividing up the profits, as a function of efforts and the production function. In this setting, strong monotonicity is the requirement that if a participant's productive ability strictly increases (perhaps through additional training) then that participant should receive more. One can also interpret this as requiring that gains in technology are distributed fairly. This is a natural extension of Young's monotonicity axiom for cooperative games [32, 33] .
Our second axiom, converse dummy is implied by strong monotonicity. It requires that if a participant puts in positive valuable effort, then that person must receive at least some of the profits. As we will see, in the additive setting this axiom is equivalent to the first one.
Our third axiom, continuous extendibility to the threshold functions, requires that the surplus sharing mechanism be well defined on an important class of production functions, the threshold functions. These are functions of the form T α (x) = 1 if x i ≥ α i for all i and 0 otherwise. In the production context these are quite common as many goods are binary, they either exist or they don't.
This paper is organized as follows: in Section 2 we provide a brief introduction to surplus sharing mechanisms, including a review of common mechanisms and standard axioms. Then in Section 3 we introduce our new axioms and discuss their relationships with standard mechanisms. In Section 4 we provide constructive characterizations of these and which we use to construct three new methods which satisfy them and also have other desirable
properties. We then discuss, in Section 5, the difficulties involved in axiomatizing these new methods, and conclude in Section 6 with a brief summary of our results.
Surplus Sharing: Definitions
We consider a surplus sharing problem with a fixed number of participants, i ∈ N = {1, 2, . . . , n}. Each player contributes a level of effort to the project, e i ∈ + . Given the vector of inputs, e, the project has a certain value V (e) which is then divided among the participants, where V (·) ∈ V, the set of all nondecreasing (once) continuously differentiable functions satisfying V (0) = 0. The division rule is denoted by x ∈ SS, where x i (e; V ) is the share of the value allocated to participant i. We assume that participants cannot have negative shares, x i (e; V ) ≥ 0, and that the total amount allocated must exactly equal the profit, n i=1 x i (e; V ) = V (e), which is often denoted "efficiency".
Standard Axioms
In addition to the basic constructs, there is a large body of literature on additional properties that sharing methods 'should' satisfy. (See [23] for a survey and an extensive bibliography.)
In this section we provide a brief survey of some of the common/important ones which will be relevant to our analysis.
The first axiom was first used by Shapley [27] to characterize the Shapley value. In the surplus sharing interpretation, it says that a participant who's effort adds no value to the project should receive none of the value of the project.
Definition 1 (Dummy)

1) Player i is a "dummy participant," if for all
2) A surplus sharing mechanism satisfies the "Dummy axiom" (DUM) if whenever player i is a dummy, x i (e; V ) = 0.
Our second axiom is nearly universal in the surplus (and cost) sharing literature. (With the notable exception of [31] .) It is usually motivated by arguments of decentralization.
Definition 2 (Additivity) A surplus sharing mechanism satisfies "Additivity" (ADD) if
Note that for cooperative games, additivity and dummy along with other basic axioms uniquely define the Shapley value; however, in the continuous surplus sharing problem there is a large class of methods which satisfy them [10] .
Our next axiom is well known. Scale invariance (SI), is the statement that the relative scales used in defining the e i 's are irrelevant to the shares, while the following axiom, demand monotonicity (DM) [22, 10] , is a basic incentive constraint which requires that participants not be penalized for increasing their level of input.
Definition 4 (Demand Monotonicity) A SSM is demand monotonic if for all e, e ≥ 0
such that e i ≤ e i and e −i = e −i and all V ∈ V, x i (e; V ) ≤ x i (e ; V ).
Examples: Surplus Sharing Mechanisms
In this section we review a number of well known SSM's.
Equal Share (ES): Perhaps the simplest cost sharing mechanism is the "Equal Share" mechanism [21] , x ES i (e; V ) = V (e)/n. However, this mechanism has many undesirable properties; in particular, it ignores the levels of input, so that a participant who supplies a large amount of input receives exactly the same share as one who supplies no input. Essentially both ES and PS violate the dummy axiom and the combination of dummy and additivity restrict the set of mechanisms to those which are "equitable" according to these and related arguments.
Shapley-Shubik (SS):
The "Shapley-Shubik" method was introduced in [30] . It arises from the application of the Shapley Value [27] to the derived cooperative game. Before we present its formula, we first describe the "Incremental" mechanism for order ψ. Let ψ be an ordering of the participants, i.e., ψ ∈ Ψ is a bijection from the set of players to the set {1, 2, ..., n}. Then the formula for this method is
method is the average over all incremental methods
This method satisfies additivity, dummy, scale invariance and demand monotonicity and is fact characterized by a combination of these four axioms [10] .
Aumann-Shapley (AS):
The Aumann-Shapley mechanism was proposed as a cost sharing mechanism in [6] and then axiomatized by economic axioms in [5, 20] . It is given by the 'diagonal' formula
which arises by applying the Shapley value to surplus sharing problem when viewed as a nonatomic game [2] . We will also be interested in weighted versions of it which were analyzed in [19] . These are defined by a weight vector w ∈ N ++ and given by the formula
where h w (t, e) i = t w i e i . Any weighted version satisfies dummy, additivity, and scale invariance, but not demand monotonicity.
Serial (SER):
The Serial method was introduced in [29, 24] for the case of homogeneous functions V (e) =V (|e i |) and extended to nonhomogeneous functions in [10] . It is given by
where 1 is the unit vector and x ∧ y is greatest lower bound of x and y, e.g., (1, 4) ∧ (3, 2) = (1, 2). Later in the paper we will be interested in a weighted version which we define as follows. Given a weight vector w ∈ N ++ define the weighted serial method by
where g w (t, e) i = (tw i ) ∧ e i . Any weighted version satisfies dummy, additivity, and demand monotonicity, but not scale invariance.
Path Methods
One insight that will be useful later, is that many of these methods can be written as an integral over a path. For example, the Aumann-Shapley method can be written as
where γ(t; e) = min[t, 1]e, while the serial method is given by an analogous formula with γ(t; e) = (t1) ∧ e. Also, any incremental method is also generated by a path. 
1) γ(t; e) is continuous and nondecreasing in t.
2) γ(0; e) = 0 and there exists at > 0 such that for all t ≥t, γ AS (t; e) = e.
Let the set of all such path functions be denoted Γ.
Given any path we can define the related surplus sharing mechanism.
Path Methods: Given a path function γ the path mechanism generated by γ is defined by:
On interesting result is that the path methods "generate" all the additive methods: i) x ∈ SS satisfies dummy and additivity.
ii) There exists a family of probability measures, indexed by e, µ e each on Γ(e), where Γ(e)
is the restriction of Γ to a specific e, such that
Although we will not use this result directly, we will construct a variety of methods using the formula in part (ii) of the proposition.
Strong Monotonicity, Converse Dummy and Threshold Functions
In this section we present three new properties that seem desirable in a surplus sharing mechanism.
Strong Monotonicity and Converse Dummy
Consider a worker who gets additional training, such that she is more efficient at her job. One would naturally expect that her pay would not decrease. Similarly, a firm which improves the quality of their input should also not expect to receive less from the joint project. This is the idea behind monotonicity. (This concept was introduced by Young [32] for the case where e i is binary.) However, if the increased productivity actually increases the total profit of the project, then one might expect the pay to actually increase. This is the new axiom of strong monotonicity. Of all the methods considered only two are strongly monotonic; however, these are typically considered the least palatable methods. Thus our goal will be to construct strongly monotonic methods which satisfy dummy and other interesting axioms.
Definition 6 (Productivity) Given two functions V and V , participant i is said to be more productive under
Closely related to strong monotonicity is the "converse dummy" axiom, Proof: Assume that x satisfies dummy, additivity and converse dummy. Consider some i, e, V, V where i is strictly more productive under V than under V at e. Then x i (e, V ) −
by additivity, where W (e) = k|e| and k is chosen to be sufficiently large so that V −V +W ∈ V. Note that dummy and additivity combine to imply
where T is a positive linear functional (on the linear vector space generated by V) and
prove that x is strongly monotonic. The other direction is proven similarly. 2
This leads to our next result:
Theorem 3 The Equal and Proportional Share methods satisfy converse dummy while the following do not: Shapley-Shubik, Aumann-Shapley and Serial.
Proof: This theorem follows immediately from the previous one. 2
Threshold Functions
Most of the methods discussed so far are only formally defined for the case when the profit functions are continuously differentiable. However, this leaves out an important class of profit functions, the threshold functions. Threshold functions arise when there is a minimum effort vector needed to complete a specific task. For example, in the production context, typically there is a certain set of parts needed to construct a machine, and without even one of these parts the machine will not function. Another interesting example arises in distributed computations (see, e.g., [15, 3] ); in this case an incomplete computation is typically worthless.
Thus, in this section we consider the extension of SSMs defined on continuously differentiable functions to the set of threshold functions. We will require that this extension be continuous.
For any α ≥ 0 let T α represent a threshold function: T α (e) is 1 if e ≥ α and 0 otherwise.
Let T be the set of all threshold functions and defineV = {V ∈ V ⊕ T | V is monotone}.
An extensionx ∈ SS(T ) of x ∈ SS is a SSM defined for all V ∈V .
Definition 9 A mechanismx ∈ SS(T ) is a continuous threshold extension (CTE) of x ∈ SS if the following hold: i) x(e; V ) =x(e; V ) for all V ∈ V
ii) For any sequence
Note that a CTE is smooth in the sense that small changes in α do not cause large changes in the allocation, when these changes do not affect the total payoff to be allocated.
Lemma 1 Any CTE,x ∈ SS(T ) of some x ∈ SS is α-continuous, i.e., x(e; T α ) is continous
in α when e = α for all α ∈ ∞ + .
Proof: Obvious from statement (ii) in the definition of a CTE.
Using this, we now show that none of the standard methods satisfying dummy have CTE's, as was the case for strict monotonicity. 
Strongly Monotonic Methods with CTEs
In this section we will construct three new methods that satisfy strong monotonicity, two of which also have unique CTE's, while also satisfying additivity and dummy. These methods are based on the intuition from Proposition 1 and are somewhat more complex than the well known additive methods. The idea behind their construction is given by the following results. x(e; T α ) =x(e; T α ) from the construction ofx.
Characterizations under Additivity and Dummy
Note that the threshold functions form a basis for the infinitely continuously differentiable monotone functions V ∞ through the following identity:
Thus, for any α, consider a sequence
pointwise. From this identity,
where for all α = α, lim k→∞ f k (α ) = 0. Sincex is linear and α-continuouŝ
Taking the limit as k → ∞ shows that lim k→∞x (e; V k ) =x(e; T α ). Sincex is linear, and V ∞ is dense inV this completes the first half of the proof. For n > 2 assume that for some S, β, a positive set of paths intersect L S (β). Choose
, where all participants except for i and j are dummy participants and thus receive no share. Essentially we have reduced this to a two participant problem,x with cost function T β i ,β j , where x is generated by the projected paths, where the projection of path γ(t; e) is simply the two components (γ i (t; e), γ j (t; e)). By assumption, the subset of paths generatingx which pass through the point (β i , β j ) has a positive measure in ν. Thus, the argument for n = 2 applies, and no extension can be α-continuous.
Thus, if we take a convex combination of paths which "cover" the region [0, e] then we can construct a method which is strongly monotonic; similarly, if choose a measure that doesn't create any "atoms" in [0, e] we will have constructed a method that has a CTE. In the following subsection, we do this for three particularly nice sets of paths.
New SSMs
The first method we denote the "Almost Flat" (AF) method as it is the method that comes closest to covering the region [0, e] evenly. The Almost Flat method is constructed as follows:
Pick an ordering ψ and a pointp ∈ [0, e]. Now define the path γ ψ,p as follows: γ ψ,p i (t; e) =:
Thus, this path is made up of "steps."
Since the path is 'flat', it is possible to compute the integrals and derive a simple formula for the SSM generated by the path γ ψ,p , denoted x ψ,p ; however, this requires significant amounts of notation, so we only present the case when n = 2. In this case we compute
and
which allows us to evaluate simple examples.
The almost flat method is made up as a "average" over all such paths:
x ψ,p (e; V )dp where κ = |Ψ|Π i∈N e i .
Once again, it is straightforward, but notationally complex, to compute the shares for the Almost Flat mechanism. For example when
and thus we can compute the shares for any polynomial V . Lastly note that this method is scale invariant.
The second mechanism that we consider is based on the weighted Aumann-Shapley mechanisms [19] . These are constructed from a weight vector, w ∈ n ++ and are generated by the paths γ
AS(w) i
(t; e) = t w i e i and are denoted by x w . Now, the "Spread AS" mechanism is given by
This mechanism is also scale invariant.
Our third mechanism is a spread version of the Serial mechanism. For any weight vector, w ∈ n ++ and are generated by the paths γ
SER(w) i
(t; e) = tw ∧ e and are denoted by x w . Now, the "Spread Serial" mechanism is given by
This mechanism is demand monotonic.
By Lemmas 2 and 3 all three of these new mechanisms are strongly monotonic and have unique CTE's. 
Characterizations under Additivity and Roadblocks to Axiomatizations
As discussed in Section 2, under Additivity and Dummy, the set of SSM's are known to be integrals over path methods according to some measure, which we will denote by ν. Strong monotonicity and the existence of CTE's impose complementary constraints on this measure:
intuitively (but not precisely) strong monotonicity essentially implies that the support of ν is dense, while CTE's exist only when ν has no atoms.
Since there are many measures which are atomless and have dense support, it is easy to construct methods which are both strongly monotonic and have CTE's. However, the characterization of any particular method is problematic as most known axiomatizations of SSM's (see e.g., [5, 20, 9, 10] ) either lead to a single SSM or a large family of them which is not easily parameterized as a subset of a finite Euclidean space. The author is unaware of any set of axioms that would single out a large but easily parameterized set of SSMs and believes that it is even more difficult to find a set of axioms which yield a specific (but nondegenerate) measure over such a class. This is a difficult problem which merits further study. For any measure whose support is dense in [0, 1] n , this SSM will be strictly monotonic;
however, it is difficult to find an axiom which will choose a specific, nondegenerate measure.
One extreme possibility is the measure that puts probability 1/2 k on w k , when {w k } ∞ k=0 is a dense subset of [0, 1] n ; although such a measure would be ruled out if we also wanted to require that the SSM have a CTE, there are still many possible nondegenerate and atomless measures.
Summary of Results
For easy reference we present the following table which summarizes our results, where columns represent methods and rows are for axioms. A check mark, √ , indicates that the axiom is satisfied, while a dash, −, indicates that it is not.
ES PS SS AS SER AF SPAS SPSER
Thus, from consideration of the axioms introduced in this paper both the spread Serial and Spread Aumann-Shapley methods are attractive new cost sharing methods as they are the only methods considered which satisfy both dummy and all three new axioms; however, as discussed in the previous section, the set of CSMs which satisfy these is extremely large and apparently quite difficult to axiomatize.
